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Reverberations in His Later System 
 
Howard P. Kainz 






Hegel indicates toward the end of his Phenomenology of Spirit that 
there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the 
various configurations of consciousness in the Phenomenology. Some general 
correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by 
Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four 
important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity 
of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1) 
in the philosophical construal of “categories”; 2) in the conceptualization of a 
“phenomenology”; 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion 
and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the 
Absolute.  
 
As is well-known, Hegel initially visualized his Jena 
Phenomenology of Spirit as an introduction to his projected system. He 
even remarks, toward the end of the Phenomenology, that there will 
be a correspondence between the various Gestalten in the 
Phenomenology and the Categories that will be generated in his later 
system of philosophy:  
 
In general, to each of the abstract Moments of [philosophical] 
Science there corresponds a configuration of appearing 
[phenomenological] Spirit. Just as Spirit in its existence is not 
richer than Science, so also Spirit in its content is not poorer 
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than Science. When the pure concepts [categories] of Science 
are known in their present form (as configurations of 
consciousness), this brings out the aspect of their reality; after 
this, their essence, the Concept, which is established in them as 
thought in simple mediation, breaks the Moments of this 
mediation apart and is exhibited [in philosophical Science] 
according to its inner opposition.1  
 
This definitely seems to imply that in the course of the 
exploration of consciousness and Spirit in the Phenomenology, certain 
important configurations will be encountered that Hegel will return to 
as Categories in his Wissenschaft der Logik, and other systematic 
endeavors, in order to develop scientifically their essential oppositions. 
But it is a matter of dispute as to whether he actually carried out this 
intention, and, if so, what "correspondences" should be particularly 
noted. 
Otto Poggeler maintains that the best way of interpreting this 
statement from the final parts of the Phenomenology is in terms of a 
projection that Hegel made before publishing the 1807 
Phenomenology.2 In his Realphilosophie of 1805-1806, Hegel had 
projected his future system as consisting of six parts: Being, Relation, 
Life and Cognition, Knowing Knowledge, Spirit, and the Self-
Knowledge of Spirit. Thus, Poggeler suggests, there are some general 
correspondences in the Phenomenology with this initial projection: The 
phenomenology of Sense-certainty with the category of Being; the 
dialectics of Perception and Understanding with the category of 
Relation; the "Truth of Self-Certainty" with the category of Life; 
Reason with the category of Knowledge; the phenomenology of Spirit 
with the Category of Spirit; and the sections on Religion and Absolute 
Knowledge with the projected Category of the "Self-knowledge of 
Spirit." But Poggeler finds no other specific and significant 
correspondences ofelements of the Phenomenology with the later 
system.  
Before proceeding any further on this question, we should take 
into account the fact that Hegel's later system included not only his 
Wissenschaft der Logik and his Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften, but also numerous works and lectures which branched 
out from the system, expanding and clarifying elements of the system. 
For instance, Hegel's publication of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des 
Rechts was a more detailed development of topics outlined in the 
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section on Objective Spirit in his Encyclopedia. His lectures on the 
Philosophy of History expanded on the general remarks in the sub-
section on Universal History in Objective Spirit in the Encyclopedia 
(§§548-549) and on the more detailed remarks on universal history in 
the Philosophy of Right (§§341-360). Likewise, Hegel's lectures on 
aesthetics expand on the basic divisions of symbolic, classical and 
romantic art discussed in the Encyclopedia in the Philosophy of Art; 
parts of Hegel's lectures on Religion expanded on the sub-section on 
Revealed Religion in the section on Absolute Spirit in the Encyclopedia 
(§§564-571); and Hegel's lectures on the History of Philosophy are, of 
course, a further development of the sub-section on Philosophy which 
brings the final triad of Absolute Spirit (after Art and Religion) to 
completion in the Encyclopedia (§§572-577).  
If we take into account all these wider developments of Hegel's 
system, do we find any significant correspondences which may help us 
to gain a greater insight into Hegel's possible fidelity to his original 
plan? Robert Grant McRae maintains that there are some obvious 
dialectical processes that carry over from the Phenomenology to the 
System.3 For example, the movements of Force and Concept in the 
chapter on Understanding in the Phenomenology have their 
counterpart in Subjective Logic in Hegel's Science of Logic, the chapter 
on Reason has reverberations in the final section of Subjective Logic 
on the Idea, the discussion of the emergence of the family and the 
state in Chapter VI on Spirit in the Phenomenology is reflected in the 
philosophy of Objective Spirit in the Encyclopedia, and the final 
chapter on “Absolute Knowledge” in the Phenomenology obviously 
corresponds to the final segment of the Encyclopedia on “Absolute 
Spirit.”  
But these are still very general correspondences. Are there any 
more specific areas where the Phenomenology of Spirit actually lays 
the groundwork for developments in Hegel’s later system, and thus 
can contribute to the elucidation of parts of that system? I suggest 
that there are four such areas:  
1. One of the first places to look for a specific and important 
correspondence between the Phenomenology and the System would 
be in chapter 5, "Reason," where Hegel differentiates the "Category" 
which characterizes true, authentic philosophical idealism from, on the 
one hand, the ten object-oriented "substantial" Aristotelian categories 
and, on the other hand, the twelve subjectively-conditioning "thinking 
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realities," i.e., the Kantian categories (and Fichte's Kantian revisionism 
in terms of the ego's self-identity). Hegel compares these two types of 
categories with his own construal, as follows:  
 
The Category, which formerly had the connotation of being the 
substantiality of what exists—either (indefinitely) the 
substantiality of existence-in-general, or the substantiality of 
existence over against consciousness—is now the substantiality, 
i.e. the simple unity, ofthe existent only insofar as it is a 
thinking-reality .... Only a one-sided, defective Idealism lets this 
unity come to the fore again as consciousness, on one side, and, 
over against consciousness, an in-itself. But the present 
Category, that is, the simple unity of Self-Consciousness and 
existence, has difference within itself. For its essence is just 
this: to be immediately identical-with-self in otherness, in 
absolute difference.4  
 
The standpoint of the Category is finally attained only at the end 
of the Phenomenology. At this point, the series of oscillations and 
ironical developments that took place in the "Science of the Experience 
of Consciousness" are superseded by a new perspective in which the 
oppositions of self-consciousness and existence, and all other related 
oppositions, are viewed serenely in the overall interrelationship 
between Spirit's Consciousness, coming to its culmination in chapter 6, 
and Spirit's Self-Consciousness emerging in chapter 7, thus making 
possible true philosophical Science. The stage is set for further 
"categorial" development, in which unity is coordinated with 
difference: For example, in Hegel's subsequent Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, starting with the Logic, "Being" is portrayed in 
its intimate relationship with nothingness, quality with quantity, 
essence with existence, form with matter; in the Philosophy of Nature, 
space and time are portrayed in their interrelationships, and polarities 
are highlighted (for example, in chemistry, electricity, and 
magnetism); and finally in the Philosophy of Spirit, we examine the 
unity-in-difference of consciousness and the unconscious, freedom and 
determinism, rights and laws, family and state, and the ultimate 
unification of Self-consciousness and Being in art, religion, and 
philosophy.  
2. Another, and more obvious, locus where the Phenomenology 
impacts on the later System, is in the first section of the third part of 
the Encyclopedia, where Hegel treats of the “Phenomenology of Spirit.” 
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The topics discussed in this section are topics also discussed in 
chapters 1-4, and the beginning of chapter 5, of the Phenomenology. 
But this section of the Encyclopedia is by no means just a summary of 
the early chapters of the Phenomenology, nor is it a revised and 
improved version, overcoming the deficiencies of the earlier work, as 
Michael Petry, translator of the “Berlin Phenomenology,” has 
suggested. Rather, it takes up the phenomenological topics from a new 
vantage point—the perspective of the Category. Thus we find no 
"phenomenological" series of ironical development—Sense-Certainty 
initially deceived about the particularity of the "Here" and "Now," but 
then forced to construe them as universal; Sense-Certainty moving 
from realism to idealism; Perception initially believing the properties of 
the Thing were essential, but then realizing that the ego is constantly 
uniting and differentiating aspects of the perceptual object; 
Consciousness examining the laws of objects and forced into 
examination of itself formulating the laws; Master and Slave 
consciousnesses ending up in a reversal of roles; Self-Consciousness 
reaching a point at which it needs to unite with Consciousness in the 
new configuration of Reason; and so forth. Rather, in the section on 
"Phenomenology" in the Encyclopedia, Hegel treats of the same topics 
"scientifically," from the standpoint of the Category of the unity of 
subject and object. Rather than letting consciousness meander 
through various "determinate negations" in trying to raise its 
certainties to truth, Hegel now stands as a third party observer, 
making explicit the dialectical relationships that exist in subjective 
spirit. He describes how the relationship to space and time involves a 
coordination of particular and universal "Heres" and "Nows," how the 
viewpoint of Perception coordinates Consciousness and sensory 
properties, how Understanding as it focuses more deeply on laws ends 
up at Self-Consciousness, how Master and Slave as types of 
consciousness result from the desire of Self-Consciousness to find 
equilibrium with its special kind of object, and how Reason finally 
brings about the Categorical synthesis of Consciousness and Self-
Consciousness. The treatments of these subjects in the Jena 
Phenomenology and the later systematic section on "Phenomenology" 
are different but complementary. Sometimes opacities that may exist 
in the earlier work can even be cleared up by areading of the later 
work, and vice versa. But by no means is the later work merely. a 
summary or abridgement of the earlier.  
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3. The chapter on Religion in the Jena Phenomenology analyzes 
the evolution from nature-religions like Zoroastrianism to "art religion" 
(exemplified primarily in ancient Greek statuary, architecture, 
hymnody, poetry and drama) to "revealed religion" (i.e., the 
phenomenological emergence of Christianity out of Hebrew religion). 
In the Encyclopedia, unlike the Phenomenology, Art and Religion are 
treated as separate moments in the development of Absolute Spirit—
art being an immediate sensuous synthesis of being and thought, 
religion being a synthesis mediated by the imagination. But there are 
many similar topics; and here again, the later treatment differs from 
the earlier by being "scientific" and categorial. Thus, the movement 
which takes place from the "happy consciousness" of Greek comedy to 
the ''unhappy consciousness" of Judaism in the Phenomenology is 
restructured in the Encyclopedia as an analysis (§§556-563) of the 
embodiment of the absolute in classical art, as compared with the 
embodiment of the absolute in the doctrine of the Incarnation; and the 
earlier phenomenological development from internal Trinitarian 
relationships of the deity to creation, and then to the knowledge of 
good and evil, to the fall, and to the subsequent atonement by the 
God-man, is analyzed in the later system (§§564-571) as an unfolding 
of the concept of the Trinity. In other words, the dialectic from 
creation to atonement in the Phenomenology of Spirit gives way in the 
Encyclopedia to the "timeless" consideration of the moments of the 
Concept of the Absolute in Religion.  
4. As mentioned above, Hegel's lectures on the philosophies of 
aesthetics, religion, and history are mostly expansions in greater detail 
of concepts developed in the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia. 
But his lectures on the history of philosophy not only expand the final 
section in the Encyclopedia, showing how philosophy synthesizes the 
absolutes arrived at in art and religion, but also are even more directly 
connected with the Phenomenology. In a brief sketch covering a few 
pages in the chapter on “Absolute Knowledge” in the Phenomenology,5 
Hegel describes how the attainment of the “absolute” standpoint of the 
identity-in-distinction of Being and thought had been attained in the 
history of modern philosophy. No names are mentioned, but it is clear 
to which philosophers Hegel is referring in his succinct overview of the 
previous two centuries: With Francis Bacon, modern philosophy began 
emphasizing observation, to discover the rationality within nature; 
then Descartes discovered Being in thought; Spinoza emphasized the 
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immediate unity of thinking and existence; Leibniz reacted against the 
selfless characteristics of the Spinozan synthesis, and "asserted the 
claims of individuality"; Voltaire and Diderot and other philosophes 
"externalized individualization in culture"; Helvetius and other 
utilitarians "arose to the thought of utility"; then philosophy began to 
"grasp existence as its own will" with Rousseau's volonté general and 
Kant's apolitical and idealist reconstruction of Rousseau's "general will" 
in his categorical imperative; finally, a subjective construal of the 
relation of self to otherness was attained by Fichte' s ego=ego, and 
Schelling produced an objective, substantial construal of the same 
relation, which unfortunately ended up as an abyss of absolute 
identity, into which everything could be arbitrarily tossed. Hegel then 
mentions the solution he himself has come up with, to mediate 
between the Fichtean and Schellingean extremes: a type of knowledge 
which "consists rather in this apparent inactivity [of Spirit] that merely 
considers how what is differentiated moves itself in itself and devolves 
once again into its unity."6  
Hegel's later lectures on the history of modern philosophy follow 
almost the same series of philosophical positions, with a few additions, 
and leading up to the then-present state of German idealism in which 
the one-sidedness of both Fichte and Schelling have finally given away 
to Absolute Knowledge as the privileged unity-in-distinction of thought 
and Being which can provide a trustworthy foundation for a truly 
"scientific" philosophical system.  
It is arguable that these lectures on the history of philosophy 
fulfill Hegel's earliest systematic intentions, encompassing what Hegel 
had in mind when in the Preface to the Phenomenology he writes,  
 
The true form in which truth exists can only be the scientific 
system of truth. The goal which I have set before myself is to 
collaborate to bring it about that philosophy approximates the 
form of Science, that philosophy can put aside its name, "the 
love of knowledge," in order to be real knowledge. The inner 
necessity for knowledge to be Science lies in its very nature, 
and the satisfactory clarification on this issue is simply the 
exposition of philosophy itself. But the external necessity, 
insofar as it can be comprehended in a universal fashion, aside 
from the accidents of person and individual occasions, is exactly 
the same as the inner necessity-[but] in the form of the way 
that time presents the existence of its moments. To 
demonstrate that the elevation of philosophy to Science is 
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immanent in our time would be the only valid justification of the 
attempts that are directed towards the goal of philosophical 
Science, because "the times" would bring about the necessity 
for this to happen, or rather actually accomplish the goal.7 
(emphasis added to the last sentence)  
 
Hegel here refers to an "external necessity" that can be comprehended 
in a temporal fashion, and there can be no doubt that Hegel, a 
consummate student of the history of philosophy, saw this history as 
leading up inevitably to his own approach to the systematization of 
philosophy. Otto Pöggeler may have had this in mind when he speaks 
about an "external" introduction to Hegel's system of philosophy:  
 
In the Encyclopedia, §§13-14, Hegel says that the history of 
philosophy is, in the element of externality, just what the 
philosophical system is, in the element of thought. What 
previously was a prerogative of the Phenomenology is now a 
function of historical reflection. This historical approach 
demonstrates, for example, that the time is ripe for the content 
of religion to be raised to the conceptual level, and for the then-
contemporary philosophy to be involved in presenting the truth 
as "objective thought." (Encyclopedia, §§24ff.)8  
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit was, of course, meant to be the 
Introduction, as well as the First Part, of Hegel's system of philosophy. 
Whether or not the history of philosophy, as an external introduction 
to his system, is an improved introduction over the Phenomenology 
itself, it seems Hegel may have had this alternative introduction in 
mind when, after finishing the Phenomenology, he sat down to write 
those words in the Preface.  
 
Notes  
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels 
and Heinrich Clainnont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988), p. 529: 
Entspricht jedem abstrakten Momente der Wissenschaft eine Gestalt 
des erscheinenden Geistd überhaupt. Wie der daseiende Geist nicht 
reicher ist als sie, so ist er in seinem Inhalte auch nicht ärmer. Die 
reinen Begriffe der Wissenschaft in dieser Form von Gestalten des 
Bewuβtseins zu erkennen, macht die Seite ihrer Realität aus, nach 
welcher ihr Wesen, der Begriff, der in ihr in seiner einfachen 
Vermittlung als Denken gesetzt ist, die Momente dieser Vermittlung 
auseinanderschlägt und nach dem inneren Gegensatze sich darstellt.  
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2. Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes 
(Freiburg/München: Karl Alber Verlag, 1973), pp. 222, 226.  
3. Robert Grant McRae, Philosophy and the Absolute (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1985), pp. 31-32, 41.  
4. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 160: “Die Kategorie, welche sonst die 
Bedeutung hatte, Wesenheit des Seyenden zu seyn, unbestimmt des 
Seyenden überhaupt oder des Seyenden gegen das Bewuβtseyn, ist 
itzt Wesenheit oder einfache Einheit des Seyenden nur als denkende 
Wirklichkeit; ... Nur der einseitige schlechte Idealismus läβt diese 
Einheit wieder als Bewuβtseyn auf die eine Seite, und ihr gegenüber 
ein Ansich treten.—Diese Kategorie nun oder einfache Einheit des 
Selbstbewuβtseyns und des Seyns hat aber an sich den Unterschied; 
denn ihr Wesen ist eben dieses, im Andersseyn oder im absoluten 
Unterschiede unmittelbar sich selbst gleich zu seyn.” In the next 
paragraph, Hegel criticizes the notion that there is a specific number of 
categories, and finds it disgraceful that Kant thought we could “scare 
up the multiplicity of categories in any old manner—for example, out 
of the types of judgement—as a 'find,' and to let oneself be satisfied 
with this state of affairs.  
5. Phänomenologie des Geistes, pp. 526--527; §§803-804 in the Miller 
translation (Oxford University Press, 1977). For a line-by-line analysis 
of this section, see my Hegel's Phenomenology: Selections 
(Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 164-169.  
6. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 527: Das Wissen besteht vielmehr in 
dieser scheinbaren Unthätigkeit, welche nur betrachtet, wie das 
Unterschiedene sich an ihm selbst bewegt, und in seine Einheit 
zurückkehrt.  
7. Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 6: Die wahre Gestalt, in welcher die 
Wahrheit existiertm, kann allein das wissenschaftliche System 
derselben sein. Daran mitzuarbeiten, daβ die Philosophie der Form der 
Wissenschaft näher komme,—dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Liebe zum 
Wissen ablegen zu können und wirkliches Wissen zu sein,—ist es, was 
ich mir vorgesetzt. Die innere Notwendigkeit, daβ das Wissen 
Wissenschaft sei, leigt in seiner Natur, und die befriedigende Erklärung 
hierüber ist allein die Darstellung der Philosophie selbst. Die äuβere 
Notwendigkeit aber, in so fern sie, abgesehen von der Zufälligkeit der 
Person und der individuen Veranlassungen, auf eine allgemeiene Weise 
gefaβt wird, ist dasselbe, was die innere, in der Gestalt, wie die Zeit 
das Dasein ihrer Momente vorstellt. Daβ die Erhebung der Philosophie 
zur Wissenschaft an der Zeit ist, dies aufzuzeigen würde daher die 
einzig wahre Rechtfergigung der Versuche sein, die diesen Zweck 
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haben, weil sie die Notwendigkeit desselben dartun, ja weil sie ihn 
zugleich ausführen würde.  
8. Otto Pöggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes, p. 226: In 
der Enzyklopädie (§§13 und 14) sagt Hegel, die Geschichte der 
Philosophie sei das im Element der Äuβerlichkeit, was das System im 
Element des Denkens sei. Was Früher der Phän. vorbehalten war, wird 
jetzt von der geschichtlichen Besinnung geleistet: diese stellt nun den 
Weg zur Wissenschaft dar. Sie zeigt z.B., daβ es an der Zeit ist, die 
Gehalte der Religion in den Begriff zu erheben, daβ die neuzeitliche 
Philosophie darauf hinausläuft, die Wahrheit als den 'objektiven 
Gedanken' zu erweisen (Enzyklopädie §§24ff.).  
 
 
 
